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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant correctly notes that the appropriate standard of 
review governing the first five issues delineated in its appellate 
brief is abuse of discretion. However, the sixth issue it presents 
for this Court's consideration, whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, involves the lower court's interpretation 
of a statute. The proper standard of review for a trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error. Ong 
Intern. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) , 
citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Hartford Leasing Corporation appeals from an Order 
of Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution With Prejudice, signed by 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson on July 15, 1993. (R. 167-168). 
Appellant filed a complaint on June 22, 1988, against the 
State of Utah, LaSal Oil and Rio Vista ("Appellees") for damages to 
its property in Moab. (R. 1-14). Rio Vista filed its answer on 
July 18, 1988. (R. 29-32). The State of Utah filed a Motion for 
a More Definite Statement from Appellant, but Appellant never filed 
a response. 
In December 1988, Appellant voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. 
Later that month Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal 
of Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy ("the Notice"). (R.69). 
Although the Notice stated that Appellant's counsel at that time, 
Dale F. Gardiner, was withdrawing from representation of Appellant, 
it also represented that Appellant had other counsel. 
Specifically, the Notice explained that "[c]ounsel for Hartford 
Leasing Corporation is George H. Speciale, Esq...." (R. 69). 
The record reflects that after the filing of this Notice, 
Appellant took no further action in 1991, 1992 or the first part of 
1993. As a result, the State of Utah and LaSal filed separate 
Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution on March 29, 1993, and 
March 31, 1993, respectively. ("Motions to Dismiss"). (R. 71-75). 
Rio Vista joined in the Motions to Dismiss on April 26, 1993. 
(R. 140-141). 
On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C. Tycksen, 
submitted Appellant's Objections in Response to Defendants' Motions 
to Dismiss, including a Request for Oral Argument. (R. 112) . 
Appellant attempted to submit yet another memorandum objecting to 
the Motions to Dismiss on June 7, 1993, entitled "Supplemental 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss." (R. 151-162). On June 8, 1993, Appellant 
filed a Notice to Submit for Decision stating that the Motions to 
Dismiss were "ready for decision of the Court." (R. 149-150). 
On July 15, 1993, Judge Anderson entered an Order of Dismissal 
for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice. (R. 167-169). Appellant 
has appealed from this Order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Because the Notice failed to clarify that Appellant 
lacked counsel in the instant proceeding as of December 30, 1988, 
Rio Vista could not be expected to inform Appellant that it must 
obtain new counsel or else appear pro se as required under Rule 4-
506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Judge 
Anderson's decision to dismiss this case due to Appellant's 
longstanding idleness, despite Rio Vista's failure to act upon an 
ambiguous Notice, was not an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II: Judge Anderson did not abuse his discretion in 
granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss for lack of prosecution. 
The Appellant evinced no interest in moving this case towards trial 
until faced with Appellees' Motions to Dismiss. Its sudden yet 
untimely procurement of still another attorney to represent it in 
opposing the Motions to Dismiss cannot excuse more than two years 
of complete inertia. 
POINT III: Contrary to Appellant's assertion, Judge Anderson 
had no obligation to dismiss this case without prejudice. 
Recognizing that Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits dismissal with prejudice, Utah courts have often exercised 
their discretion by dismissing cases with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. Judge Anderson did not abuse his discretion because his 
order of dismissal with prejudice was supported by procedural rule 
and case precedent. 
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POINT IV: Judge Anderson did not abuse his discretion by 
ruling on the Motions to Dismiss without holding a hearing. 
Further, Appellant withdrew its request for oral argument by its 
Notice to Submit for Decision. 
POINT V: Judge Anderson did not misinterpret Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Rather than allowing 
parties to file potentially endless streams of supplemental 
memoranda in support of a motion, Rule 4-501 efficiently limits 
parties to filing a memorandum in support of a motion, one in 
opposition, and one in reply. Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum 
of June 7, 1993, was a second opposition memorandum not authorized 
under Rule 4-501. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE ANDERSON DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY 
DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION 
BY APPELLANT SIMPLY BECAUSE RIO VISTA FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH RULE 4-506(3) OF THE UTAH CODE 
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION THROUGH NO FAULT OF 
ITS OWN. 
Appellant argues that Appellees failed to advise it of its 
responsibility to obtain new counsel or appear pro se as required 
by Rule 4-506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when 
Dale F. Gardiner withdrew as its attorney in 1988. For this 
alleged inadvertence of Appellees back in 1988, Appellant asks that 
this entire proceeding be revived by overturning Judge Anderson's 
Order of Dismissal. 
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POINT II 
JUDGE ANDERSON'S DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF 
PROSECUTION WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
BECAUSE APPELLANT IGNORED THIS CASE FOR MORE 
THAN TWO YEARS. 
Appellant states that the trial judge may consider five 
factors in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute: the conduct of both parties; the opportunity 
that each has had to move the case forward; what each party has 
done to move the case forward; what difficulty has been caused to 
the other side; and whether injustice may result from dismissal. 
K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982) . It then 
claims that the Appellees have done as little as Appellant to move 
this case to trial, thereby precluding dismissal for its failure to 
prosecute. 
Even though the first three factors request a judge to examine 
a defendant's conduct as well as the plaintiff's, the ultimate 
burden "is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course 
without unusual or unreasonable delay." Charlie Brown Constr., 
Inc. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) . The 
plaintiff faces responsibility for prosecuting its claim with 
diligence, not the defendant; if the plaintiff is dilatory, it must 
accept the penalty of dismissal. Id. 
Consequently, the mere fact that a defendant may have missed 
an opportunity to move a case forward cannot serve to prevent a 
-6-
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de. It cites Johnson 
v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 13'-o - •.. . ' as support for its 
contention that dismissal after new counsel reactivates the case 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. That case is distinguishable 
from the instant case because the plaintiff's new counsel in 
Firebrand, Inc. had revived the case prior to the filing of the 
motion to dismiss. In the situation at hand, Appellant's new 
counsel filed his appearance as counsel only after Appellees filed 
their Motion to Dismiss. As a result, this case is more analogous 
to Country Meadows, where the court upheld a dismissal upon 
distinguishing Firebrand, Inc. from proceedings involving 
reactivation after the filing of a motion to dismiss. Country 
Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216. 
Trial courts have considerable discretion to dismiss cases for 
lack of prosecution. Grundmann v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1984). Judge Anderson's decision to dismiss this case 
due to Appellant's absolute inactivity for more than two years lay 
within this extensive discretion. 
POINT III 
JUDGE ANDERSON DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY 
DISMISSING THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE. 
Appellee points out that Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure implicates a trial court's discretion to dismiss an 
action without prejudice. Of course, the language of the rule 
likewise implies that the court has authority to dismiss with 
prejudice. Utah courts have often exercised their authority to 
dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute. See, e.g. , 
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POINT IV 
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POINT V 
J U D Q E A N D E R S 0 N # S D E T E R M I N A T I O N THAT APPELLANT 
COULD NOT FILE A SECOND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION DID NOT MISINTERPRET A UTAH CODE 
PROVISION EXPRESSLY PERMITTING A PARTY TO FILE 
ONLY ONE MEMORANDUM OPPOSING A MOTION, 
Appellant somehow thinks that Rule A.I 
Code of Judicial Administration, which limits memoranda ; en 
9 
pages in length in the interest of judicial economy, conversely 
sanctions endless streams of supplemental memoranda at the same 
time. Appellant maintains that the word "memoranda" as used in the 
rule refers to an infinite number of memoranda a single party may 
wish to unload on the court. The word instead refers to the 
"memoranda" that all parties are permitted to file in regards to a 
motion under Rule 4-501(1) (b) and (c) . Thus, if a party files a 
motion with a supporting memorandum, Rule 4-501(1)(b) allows each 
party opposing the motion to file a memorandum in opposition. Rule 
4-501(1) (c) then permits the party that filed the motion to submit 
a reply memorandum. Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss represented a second 
memorandum in opposition to the motion not contemplated by Rule 
4-501. Therefore, Judge Anderson did not err in interpreting Rule 
4-501 to mean that Appellant could not file as many opposing 
memoranda as it wanted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Rio Vista respectfully requests that 
this Court deny Hartford Leasing Corporation's appeal and affirm 
the trial court's Order of Dismissal. 
DATED this /ff day of December, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By
 t/j,^jL^ fi /U*^AA— 
Hi/ James CI egg 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellee Rio Vista 
-10-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r
:'\i.]^ •• ::•.: y tn.--- ailed true- ::.: r.-rrecr ^opies of 
t h e f< • --I ...<.. .^  ^ t *.M. - : 
class, postage piepctiu • .;•.-• following on th< 1ST -^ -y of 
December, 1993. 
Steven, •-.. . i/yeksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
45 East: Vine Street 
Murra- Mi -u P^*1'""'-/ 
Alan S. Bachman 
Assistant Attorney Gener al 
Attorney for Appellee State 
Room 4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake C:i ty# Utah 841 2 4 
J. Michael Hansen 
Attorney for Appellee La Sal Oil 
Suitter, Axlancl, Armstrong & Hansen 
175 South West Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 03 
I ^J— ^ &4t+**A. ^ _ 
-] 1 -
Utah Court of Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Q£Q \ g t993 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA LIMITED, a Utah 
Corporation dba MOAB U-SERVE 
aka STARS FOOD STORE, LA SAL OIL 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, dba 
GORDON'S SINCLAIR, STATE OF UTAH 
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE 
and JOHN DOES I-X. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case NO. 930612-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE RIO VISTA OIL, LTD. 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Alan S. Bachman 
Attorney for Appellee State 
Assistant Attorney General 
Room 4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
J. Michael Hansen 
Attorney for Appellee La Sal 
Oil 
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong 
175 South West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
H. James Clegg 
Julianne Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellee Rio 
Vista 
Snow, christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §78-
2-2(4) and §78-2a-3(2)(K) of the Utah Judicial Code, permitting the 
Court of Appeals to preside over cases transferred to it by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ft uU ^P.Bi 
'4 James Clegg 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellee Rio Vista 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss Dated 6/21/93 
SEVENTH DISTRICT CUUHF 
^ Grand County 
^
 m
 J UN 2 1 1993 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY . _ 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, a Utah 
Corporation, dba MOAB U-SERV, aka 
STARS FOOD STORE, LaSALLE OIL CO., 
a Utah corporation, dba GORDON'S : 
SINCLAIR, STATE OP UTAH, 
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. : 
: RULING ON MOTION 
: TO DISMISS 
: Civil No. 880705692 
: Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant State of Utah ("Utah") has filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Hartford Leasing Corporation 
("Hartford11) with prejudice for failure to prosecute, pursuant to 
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. The other defendants, La Sal Oil Company 
("La Sal") and Rio Vista Oil Limited ("Rio Vista") have either 
joined in or moved separately for the same relief• Hartford has 
filed an objection and a supporting memorandum. 
Hartford has also filed a supplemental memorandum, to 
which La Sal responded with a motion to strike. The Court agrees 
with La Sal that the rules do not provide for supplemental 
memoranda. The motion to strike is accordingly granted and the 
Court will not consider the arguments contained therein in its 
decision. 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 880705692 
Page 2 
This action was filed in June 22, 1988, Rio Vista 
answered on July 18, 1988. Utah responded on August 24, 1988, 
with a Motion for More Definite Statement, which was granted.1 
La Sal answered on December 7, 1988. On December 30, 1988, 
counsel for Hartford filed a Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of 
Bankruptcy. This document states that counsel for Hartford is 
George H. Speciale; but from the context, it is not possible to 
be sure whether Mr. Speciale was bankruptcy counsel or counsel in 
this case. Certainly Mr. Speciale did not file a notice of 
appearance in this case. 
There is no question that, between December 30, 1988, 
and the filing of the first motion to dismiss on March 29, 1993, 
Hartford has done nothing to move this case forward. It is 
incumbent upon Hartford to explain why four years of inaction are 
justified by a bankruptcy filing. Hartford has provided no 
information about why this case could not have been pursued 
during the bankruptcy, or even when the bankruptcy ended.2 It is 
also incumbent upon Hartford, as plaintiff, to move a case 
forward. That defendants have not pressed Hartford to pursue its 
action during the last four years is no excuse for the failure of 
Hartford to do so. 
Hartford has never filed the amended complaint required by this ruling. 
2La Sal asserts, in its reply memorandum, that the bankruptcy was dismissed in October, 
1990. 
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Hartford has presented no substantial explanation of 
its failure to pursue this action. The Court is convinced, from 
the evidence and arguments presented, that Hartford elected to 
ignore this action, hoping that something would happen to make 
prosecution of the case less expensive, or improve its chances of 
success. 
The defendants claim that they have suffered prejudice 
because the passage of time has affected their ability to gather 
evidence for the defense. The Court discounts some of those 
claims because most of the defendants have had the opportunity 
and the incentive to gather much of the same evidence in related 
matters. However, the Court recognizes that witnesses become 
less available as time passes and that some tests, particularly 
on carpeting, cannot be performed now that the carpeting has been 
replaced. 
Hartford asserts that the failure of defendants to give 
notice to appoint successor counsel or appear in person mandates 
denial of the motion. The Court agrees that defendants did fail 
to comply with Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Given the ambiguity in the notice of withdrawal and the absence 
of a notice of appearance by other counsel, the defendant should 
have given a notice under Rule 4-506. However, the remedy for 
such a failure is not necessarily denial of the motion. The 
remedy is to grant Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is 
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filed in violation of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately 
respond. It is evident here that Hartford has had that 
opportunity. 
The motions to dismiss are granted. Counsel for the 
defendants are directed to prepare an order or orders for 
execution by the Court. 
DATED this ji\^ / day of June, 1993. 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, a 
Utah corporation, dba MOAB 
U-SERVE, aka STARS FOOD STORE, 
LASALLE OIL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, dba GORDON'S 
SINCLAIR, STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE 
and JOHN DOES I-X 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FOR LACK OF 
PROSECUTION WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 880705692 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
After review of the pleadings and filings of counsel in 
this matter and upon receipt of the Notice to Submit for Decision, 
and good cause appearing therefore, it is therefore ORDERED that: 
1. The Motions to Dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff 
Hartford Leasing Corporation ("Hartford") with prejudice for 
failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., are hereby-
granted. The entire complaint of Plaintiff is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice against all Defendants. The Motions to Dismiss 
include the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant State of Utah, 
Defendant La Sal Oil Company ("La Sal") and as joined by Defendant 
Rio Vista Oil Limited. Hartford filed an objection and supporting 
memorandum. Defendant State of Utah ("State") and Defendant 
La Sal filed a reply. 
2. Hartford also filed a supplemental memorandum. 
Defendant State and Defendant La Sal filed a motion to strike the 
supplemental memorandum. This is based on the determination that 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501, does not 
provide for supplemental memoranda and the motion to strike is 
accordingly granted and the Court did not consider the arguments 
contained in the supplemental memoranda in its decision. 
3. This Order is based upon the Court's "Ruling on 
Motion to Dismiss", dated June 21, 1993, on file herein, and hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
4. Each party is responsible for its own costs and fees 
incurred in this matter. 
DATED this day of July, 1993 
I 
rable Lyle R. Anderson 
S t r i c t Court Judge 
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THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, 
LA SAL OIL COMPANY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED ORDER 
Civil No. 880705692 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Plaintiff filed Hartford Leasing's Objection to 
Proposed Order dated July 15, 1993, by beginning a facsimile 
transmission at 4:58 p.m., which ended at 5:10 p.m. The Court 
had already signed the Order of Dismissal with instructions to 
file it if no objection was received on July 15, 1993. That 
order was filed before the facsimile transmission was received. 
Plaintiff asks the Court to set aside its ruling for 
several reasons. 
It is true that plaintiff requested oral argument when 
it filed its original memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss. Under Rule 4-501, plaintiff would have been entitled to 
oral argument. However, plaintiff thereafter filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision that reads in full as follows: 
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Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Dismissal filed with the Court on or near the 7th 
day of April, 1993, by Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, is now at issue and ready for 
decision of the Court, 
The natural interpretation of this notice is that 
nothing remained to be done before the Court rendered a decision, 
and that plaintiff had waived its right to oral argument. The 
Court accordingly ruled without oral argument. 
Plaintiff now presents evidence, or at least argument, 
about additional efforts it made to push this case toward a 
resolution. The Court cannot consider these arguments or 
evidence. They should have been presented before the motions 
were submitted for decision. 
The Court reaffirms its ruling that supplemental 
memoranda are not permitted. Even if they were permitted, the 
supplemental memoranda submitted by plaintiff before it filed the 
Notice to Submit for Decision would not have altered the Court's 
decision. 
Rule 41, U.R.C.P. clearly states that dismissals for 
failure to prosecute are with prejudice unless the Court other-
wise specifies. This Court specifically states that this 
dismissal is with prejudice. 
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Plaintiff's objection is accordingly overruled and the 
dismissal is confirmed. 
DATED the 19th day of July, 1993. 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rules 4-501 
and 4-506(3) 
le 4-108 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 856 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
l ie 4-501. Motions, 
tent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
pporting memoranda and documents with the 
urt. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
id scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
pplicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all dis-
ict and circuit courts except proceedings before the 
>urt commissioners and the small claims depart-
lent of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to 
stitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraor-
mary relief. 
tatement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and m e m o 
anda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant 
portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Mem-
oranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in para-
graph (2), except as waived by order of the court 
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte applica-
tion is made to file an over-length memorandum, 
the application shall state the length of the prin-
cipal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include 
a Bummary of the memorandum, not to exceed 
five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a mo-
tion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, 
and all supporting documentation. If the re-
sponding party fails to file a memorandum in op-
position to the motion within ten days after ser-
vice of the motion, the moving party may notify 
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this 
rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk 
to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Sub-
mit for Decision." The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be sub-
mitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgmen t 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material 
facte as to which movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mo-
tion. The points and authorities in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of ma-
terial facts as to which the party contends a gen-
uine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if ap-
plicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. 
All material facts set forth in the movant's state-
ment and properly supported by an accurate ref-
erence to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's state-
ment. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file 
a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively de-
cided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the re-
questing party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a 
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered 
to the judge hearing the matter at least two 
working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies 
and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made 
at the time the parties file their principal memo-
randa, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and no-
tice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a 
request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or 
where the motion does not raise significant legal is-
sues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own 
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments 
of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all 
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if re-
quested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
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Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for 
withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceed-
ings in trial courts of record except guardians ad 
litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record 
without the approval of the court except when (a) a 
motion has been filed and is pending before the court 
or (b) a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. 
Under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of 
record, written notice of the withdrawal must be 
served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney 
and upon all other parties not in default and a certifi-
cate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial 
date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial 
date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or sus-
pended or withdraws from the case or ceases to act as 
an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in writing, 
the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to 
retain another attorney or appear in person before 
opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
against the client. A copy of the written notice shall 
be filed with the court and no further proceedings 
shall be held in the matter until 20 days have elapsed 
from the date of filing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b) 
609 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 42 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to 
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of 
any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) 
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a 
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not 
be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal un-
der this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the 
court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivi-
sion and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply 
to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the 
claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivi-
sion (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the in-
troduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any 
court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court 
may make such order for the payment of costs of the 
action previously dismissed as it may deem proper 
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the 
plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to ad-
verse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pur-
suant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provi-
sional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond 
or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to 
the adverse party against whom such provisional 
remedy was obtained. 
